-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

______________________________________________________________________________

                        SUSE Security Announcement

        Package:                kernel
        Announcement ID:        SUSE-SA:2006:049
        Date:                   Fri, 18 Aug 2006 16:00:00 +0000
        Affected Products:      SUSE SLES 10
                                SUSE SLED 10
        Vulnerability Type:     local privilege escalation
        Severity (1-10):        7
        SUSE Default Package:   yes
        Cross-References:       CVE-2006-2451, CVE-2006-2935, CVE-2006-3626

    Content of This Advisory:
        1) Security Vulnerability Resolved:
             Various kernel security problems
           Problem Description
        2) Solution or Work-Around
        3) Special Instructions and Notes
        4) Package Location and Checksums
        5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:
            none
        6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

______________________________________________________________________________

1) Problem Description and Brief Discussion

   The SUSE Linux Enterprise 10 kernel was updated to fix the following
   security problems:

   - CVE-2006-3626: A race condition allows local users to gain root privileges
                    by changing the file mode of /proc/self/ files
                    in a way that causes those files (for instance
                    /proc/self/environ) to become setuid root.

   - CVE-2006-2935: A stack based buffer overflow in CDROM / DVD handling was
                    fixed which could be used by a physical local attacker
                    to crash the kernel or execute code within kernel
                    context, depending on presence of automatic DVD
                    handling in the system.

   - CVE-2006-2451: Due to an argument validation error in prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
                    a local attacker can easily gain administrator
                    (root) privileges.

   and the following non security bugs:

   - Limit the maximum number of LUNs to 16384
   - LSI 1030/MPT Fusion driver hang during error recovery --
     Optionally disable QAS
   - advance buffer pointers in h_copy_rdma() to avoid data corruption

2) Solution or Work-Around

   There is no known workaround, please install the update packages.

3) Special Instructions and Notes

   None.

4) Package Location and Checksums

   The preferred method for installing security updates is to use the YaST
   Online Update (YOU) tool. YOU detects which updates are required and
   automatically performs the necessary steps to verify and install them.
   Alternatively, download the update packages for your distribution manually
   and verify their integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
   announcement. Then install the packages using the command

     rpm -Fhv 

   to apply the update, replacing  with the filename of the
   downloaded RPM package.

   Our maintenance customers are notified individually. The packages are
   offered for installation from the maintenance web:

   SUSE SLE 10 for AMD64 and Intel EM64T
     
   SUSE SLE 10 for x86
     
   SUSE SLE 10 for IPF
     
   SUSE SLE 10 for IBM zSeries 64bit
     
   SUSE SLE 10 for IBM iSeries and IBM pSeries
     
______________________________________________________________________________

5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:

   none
______________________________________________________________________________

6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

  - Announcement authenticity verification:

    SUSE security announcements are published via mailing lists and on Web
    sites. The authenticity and integrity of a SUSE security announcement is
    guaranteed by a cryptographic signature in each announcement. All SUSE
    security announcements are published with a valid signature.

    To verify the signature of the announcement, save it as text into a file
    and run the command

      gpg --verify 

    replacing  with the name of the file where you saved the
    announcement. The output for a valid signature looks like:

      gpg: Signature made  using RSA key ID 3D25D3D9
      gpg: Good signature from "SuSE Security Team "

    where  is replaced by the date the document was signed.

    If the security team's key is not contained in your key ring, you can
    import it from the first installation CD. To import the key, use the
    command

      gpg --import gpg-pubkey-3d25d3d9-36e12d04.asc

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SUSE update packages are available on many mirror FTP servers all over the
    world. While this service is considered valuable and important to the free
    and open source software community, the authenticity and the integrity of
    a package needs to be verified to ensure that it has not been tampered
    with.

    There are two verification methods that can be used independently from
    each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or RPM package:

    1) Using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package
    2) MD5 checksums as provided in this announcement

    1) The internal rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the
       authenticity of an RPM package. Use the command

        rpm -v --checksig 

       to verify the signature of the package, replacing  with the
       filename of the RPM package downloaded. The package is unmodified if it
       contains a valid signature from build@suse.de with the key ID 9C800ACA.

       This key is automatically imported into the RPM database (on
       RPMv4-based distributions) and the gpg key ring of 'root' during
       installation. You can also find it on the first installation CD and at
       the end of this announcement.

    2) If you need an alternative means of verification, use the md5sum
       command to verify the authenticity of the packages. Execute the command

         md5sum 

       after you downloaded the file from a SUSE FTP server or its mirrors.
       Then compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       SUSE security announcement. Because the announcement containing the
       checksums is cryptographically signed (by security@suse.de), the
       checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package if the
       signature of the announcement is valid. Note that the md5 sums
       published in the SUSE Security Announcements are valid for the
       respective packages only. Newer versions of these packages cannot be
       verified.

  - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    suse-security@suse.com
        -   General Linux and SUSE security discussion.
            All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    suse-security-announce@suse.com
        -   SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (FAQ),
    send mail to  or
    .

    ====================================================================    SUSE's security contact is  or .
    The  public key is listed below.
    ====================================================================