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                        SUSE Security Announcement

        Package:                madwifi
        Announcement ID:        SUSE-SA:2006:074
        Date:                   Mon, 11 Dec 2006 18:00:00 +0000
        Affected Products:      SUSE SLED 10
                                SUSE Linux 9.3
                                SUSE Linux 10.0
        Vulnerability Type:     remote code execution
        Severity (1-10):        10
        SUSE Default Package:   yes
        Cross-References:       CVE-2006-6332

    Content of This Advisory:
        1) Security Vulnerability Resolved:
             Atheros WLAN driver remote root exploit
           Problem Description
        2) Solution or Work-Around
        3) Special Instructions and Notes
        4) Package Location and Checksums
        5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:
            See SUSE Security Summary Report.
        6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

______________________________________________________________________________

1) Problem Description and Brief Discussion

   The madwifi-ng Atheros Wireless LAN card driver is subject to
   a remotely exploitable stack buffer overflow, which either code
   execution possibility or at least a denial of service (kernel crash).

   A physical local attacker (within WLAN range) has to provide an
   malicious access point which the card tries to associate with to be
   able to effect this attack.

   This issue is tracked by the Mitre CVE ID CVE-2006-6332.

   This update also brings the madwifi driver to version 0.9.2.1.

   Affected SUSE Linux products:
   SUSE Linux Desktop 10 - Code execution is possible when this problem
   is exploited. Fixed madwifi-kmp-* packages are available and linked
   from this advisory.

   SUSE Linux 9.3 and 10.0 - These distributions use an older madwifi
   driver version, where an attacker can only overflow the buffer with
   hex characters, making code execution nearly impossible but a denial
   of service (crash) still likely.  Updates for 9.3 and 10.0 are in
   preparation and will be in the next kernel security update.

   Other SUSE Linux versions do not ship the madwifi driver or are not
   vulnerable to this problem.

   For SUSE Linux 10.1 and openSUSE 10.2 the Madwifi community
   provides fixed driver modules and a new driver module layout on
       
2) Solution or Work-Around

   There is no known workaround, please install the update packages.

3) Special Instructions and Notes

   It is sufficient to rmmod and then modprobe the "ath_pci" kernel
   module after installing the update.

   The recommended way to get a known good state is to reboot the machine.

4) Package Location and Checksums

   The preferred method for installing security updates is to use the YaST
   Online Update (YOU) tool. YOU detects which updates are required and
   automatically performs the necessary steps to verify and install them.
   Alternatively, download the update packages for your distribution manually
   and verify their integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
   announcement. Then install the packages using the command

     rpm -Fhv 

   to apply the update, replacing  with the filename of the
   downloaded RPM package.

   Our maintenance customers are notified individually. The packages are
   offered for installation from the maintenance web:

   SUSE SLED 10
     http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/3416396e4a9f8f1824b11dc72bbdce3e.html

______________________________________________________________________________

5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:

   See SUSE Security Summary Report.
______________________________________________________________________________

6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

  - Announcement authenticity verification:

    SUSE security announcements are published via mailing lists and on Web
    sites. The authenticity and integrity of a SUSE security announcement is
    guaranteed by a cryptographic signature in each announcement. All SUSE
    security announcements are published with a valid signature.

    To verify the signature of the announcement, save it as text into a file
    and run the command

      gpg --verify 

    replacing  with the name of the file where you saved the
    announcement. The output for a valid signature looks like:

      gpg: Signature made  using RSA key ID 3D25D3D9
      gpg: Good signature from "SuSE Security Team "

    where  is replaced by the date the document was signed.

    If the security team's key is not contained in your key ring, you can
    import it from the first installation CD. To import the key, use the
    command

      gpg --import gpg-pubkey-3d25d3d9-36e12d04.asc

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SUSE update packages are available on many mirror FTP servers all over the
    world. While this service is considered valuable and important to the free
    and open source software community, the authenticity and the integrity of
    a package needs to be verified to ensure that it has not been tampered
    with.

    There are two verification methods that can be used independently from
    each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or RPM package:

    1) Using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package
    2) MD5 checksums as provided in this announcement

    1) The internal rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the
       authenticity of an RPM package. Use the command

        rpm -v --checksig 

       to verify the signature of the package, replacing  with the
       filename of the RPM package downloaded. The package is unmodified if it
       contains a valid signature from build@suse.de with the key ID 9C800ACA.

       This key is automatically imported into the RPM database (on
       RPMv4-based distributions) and the gpg key ring of 'root' during
       installation. You can also find it on the first installation CD and at
       the end of this announcement.

    2) If you need an alternative means of verification, use the md5sum
       command to verify the authenticity of the packages. Execute the command

         md5sum 

       after you downloaded the file from a SUSE FTP server or its mirrors.
       Then compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       SUSE security announcement. Because the announcement containing the
       checksums is cryptographically signed (by security@suse.de), the
       checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package if the
       signature of the announcement is valid. Note that the md5 sums
       published in the SUSE Security Announcements are valid for the
       respective packages only. Newer versions of these packages cannot be
       verified.

  - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    opensuse-security@opensuse.org
        -   General Linux and SUSE security discussion.
            All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    suse-security-announce@suse.com
        -   SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (FAQ),
    send mail to  or
    .

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